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Abstract
Does intellectual property satisfy the requirements of the Lockean proviso, that
the appropriator leave “enough and as good” or that he at least not “deprive
others”? If an author’s appropriation of a work he has just created is analogous
to a drinker “taking a good draught” in the ﬂow of an inexhaustible river, or to
someone magically “causing springs of water to ﬂow in the desert,” how could
it not satisfy the Lockean proviso? An influential attempt to justify intellectual
property contends that nobody can reasonably object to such a regime because
it will necessarily satisfy the Lockean proviso. This paper discusses two versions
of this argument in the context of copyright law, reconstructed from insights
from Justin Hughes, Adam Moore and Robert Nozick. In essence, these two
arguments support that intellectual appropriators necessarily satisfy the Lockean
proviso because they deprive nobody, just like someone drinking from a river, or
somewhat creating magic...
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of   copyright   law,   reconstructed   from  insights   from Justin  Hughes,





fail   or   lead   to   very   weak   conclusions.   This   in   turn   affects   the
plausibility   of   other   proprietarian   justifications   for   intellectual
property which also require that the Lockean proviso be satisfied.
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Does   intellectual   property   satisfy   the   requirements   of   the
Lockean  proviso,   that   the  appropriator   leave   “enough  and  as
good” or that he at  least not “deprive others”? If  an author’s
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This   paper   will   challenge   the   claim   that   the   particular
characteristics   of   intellectual   creation   ensure   that   intellectual
property rights necessarily satisfy the Lockean proviso. As we
shall see, the “water drinker” and “magical springs” arguments
are   intuitively   appealing,  but  ultimately  misleading.  The  fact
that   the   Lockean   proviso   appears   easier   to   satisfy   in   the
intellectual realm than in the material realm is probably due to
the difficulty of transposing the Lockean proviso to the former




the   Lockean   proviso   as   belonging   to   the   broader   family   of
“proprietarian”  justifications (1).  Having distinguished between
two readings of the proviso (2), I will assess whether a copyright
regime   satisfies   even   Locke's   original   proviso,   by   addressing
arguments   made   by   Nozick,   Hughes   and   Moore   (3).   After
considering some possible objections to my reasoning (4), I will
then   turn   on   the   issue   whether   copyright   at   least   satisfies
Nozick's   revised   version   of   the  proviso   (5).  I  will   eventually

















that   all   enforceable   moral   rights   are   moral   property   rights
(rights over things). The justice of a state of affairs is, on this
view,   a  matter   of  whether   individuals   have   a   right   to   their




Proprietarian  arguments   for   intellectual   property   aim   to
show   that   because   of   certain   circumstances,   authors   of
intellectual   works   are   entitled   to   property   rights   on   their
creations   that   are   grounded   in   “natural”   or   “moral   law”,   far
stronger than the mere conventional rights protected by positive
law (Fisher, 2001).
















because   she   deserves   to   be   rewarded,   or   because   her   self­
ownership has extended into the work, etc. (cf. Hughes, 1988;
Becker, 1993) 
Another   important   strand   of   arguments   are   negative
arguments   (Attas,   2008),   which   generally   focus   on   whether
3
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facie  positive   justification   for   an   appropriation,   it   is   only
legitimate   if   it   does   leave   others   “enough   and   as   good”   for
themselves.
But the Lockean proviso can also be seen as a necessary and
sufficient  condition,   therefore   grounding   a   purely   negative
justification for property rights. A good example of such purely
negative justification can be found in Nozick's  influential book,
Anarchy,   State   and   Utopia  (Nozick,   1974).  After   discarding
derisively   some   positive   arguments   for   intellectual   property,
Nozick develops an original argumentative strategy: rather than
trying to answer the question “why property?”, he is interested in






certain   conditions,   no   one   can   reasonably   object   to   an
appropriation. 
Nozick   himself   only   discusses   the   issue   of   intellectual
1 Locke also provides a  “non-waste” proviso, sometimes discussed in the context 
of intellectual property. We will not address this proviso here, as it is often 




property  in  a  brief  but   insightful  passage.  Others  have  made
more   comprehensive   attempts   to   justify   intellectual





To   discuss   this   negative   justification   for   intellectual
property,   I  will  distinguish  between  two  interpretation of   the
proviso.
2. Two interpretations of the Lockean proviso
Taken   literally,   Locke's   original   proviso   would   forbid
appropriation whenever it does not leave “enough and as good”
for others, in other words whenever it restricts someone else's





nowadays  impossible   to   ignore.  And  in  a  limited world,  with




In   an   influential   passage   of  Anarchy,   State,   and  Utopia,
Nozick proposes a revised interpretation of the Lockean proviso
(Nozick,   1974,   174­182)3.  According   to  him,   the   fundamental
purpose   of   the   Lockean   proviso   is   to   guarantee   that   an
2 In what follows, we will use “appropriation” in the context of intellectual 
property to denote an individual's claim to a property right in an intellectual 
work.
3 I will however sidestep Nozick's laborious and somewhat confusing distinction 
between his “weaker” and “stringent” proviso (p. 176), that Cohen describes as a 
case of “expository sloppiness” (Cohen, 1995, 90). I take it that Nozick's most 
significant contribution is his emphasis on how the Lockean proviso is about not 
worsening the position of others, and his suggestion that such purpose can be 
attained by providing for a compensation.
5
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appropriation   does   not  worsen  the   position   of   others.   If   the
position of no one is worsened, no one can reasonably complain
against   the appropriation.  So Nozick's   revision of   the proviso
permit failure to leave enough and as good, as an appropriate
compensation is provided to ensure that the position of others is
not   worsened.   Indeed,   if   the   productive   use   of   the   resource
appropriated can benefit non­appropriators (because of spillovers
or direct compensation), then the net effect on the position of





is   thereby   worsened   (…)   Someone   whose   appropriation
otherwise  would   violate   the   proviso   still  may   appropriate
provided he compensates the others so that their situation is
not thereby worsened”






Of   course,   such   theoretical   exercise   crucially   depends   on
certains   assumptions,   notably   regarding   the   relevant   counter­
factual   situation (e.g.   “the  state  of  nature”)   in  comparison to






them,  meaning   that   they  have  a  privilege,   in   the  Hohfeldian
sense   (Hohfeld,   1913)4.   In   this   interpretation,   the   Lockean
proviso therefore requires that the position of no one is worsened
4 According to Hohfeld's conceptualization of the fundamental jural relations, a 
privilege (or “liberty”) implies the absence of a duty (not) to do something, while



















for  material   property,   as   it   could   be   justified   even  without
compensation.
I   will   consider   two   strands   of   argument   supporting   this
conclusion.  The  first  argument,  which we will  call   the “water
drinker  argument”,   can  be   found  in   the work of  Hughes  and
Moore5.   It   argues   that   intellectual   appropriations   necessarily





A)  Some have noted that, while  Locke's original  is clearly
untenable for natural resources, it seems far easier to satisfy in
the intellectual realm. 
5 For the sake of clarity, we will not discuss at length the complete reasonings of 
Hughes and Moore, each richer than our account suggest. However, we hope that
by emphasizing on the premises that we frame in the context of what we call the 
“water drinker argument”, we will be able to address a central issue for the 




prior   to   the   formation   of   property   rights   is  more   similar   to
Locke’s   common   than   is   the   unclaimed  wilderness”   (Hughes,
1988,   315).     Or   as  Moore   puts   it,   the   case   of   an   author
appropriating a particular  work  from the common of   ideas  is
quite alike Locke's example of a man drinking in the stream of a
river (Moore, 2004, 117): 
“No   body   could   think   himself   injured   by   the   drinking   of
another man,  though he  took a good draught,  who had a
whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst”
(Locke, 1690, §33)
According   to  Moore,   the   reason  why   the   case   of   intellectual
appropriation is similar to Locke's example of a man drinking in
a river  is   that  “[t]he number of   ideas,  collections of   ideas,  or
intangible   works   available   for   appropriation   is   practically
infinite”   (Moore,   2004,   114).   Although   leading   to   the   same
conclusion, Hughes's argument is slightly different, as it relies on
the   idea­expression   dichotomy   in   copyright   law   (a   doctrine
limiting   the   scope   of   copyright   protection   to   particular
expressions,  not   ideas   themselves):   “Because  creating property
rights  in an idea never completely excludes others from using
[the] idea, it need not be justified by Locke's legerdemain that




We  will   call   this   argument   the  water   drinker   argument.  To
















right   analogy   with   Locke's   notion   of   the   “common”   in   the
intellectual   realm.   What   would   be   the   equivalent   of   the







quite   a  hazardous   task,   as   others  have  noted   (Fisher,   2001),
since   it   requires   taking   position   on   a   number   of   difficult
questions,   such  as   the  nature  of   the   creative  process,   or   the
ontological status of ideas or intellectual works. . If we want to













appropriated   in   a  way   that   they   do   not   intersect,   it   is   not
surprising that the proviso appears to be necessarily satisfied.
But is it really the case that the Lockean proviso should only be





premise.   To   recall,   this   later   premise   states   is   that   the











(HM0)   Individuals  have  no   legitimate  claim to  use  works
that they have not themselves created
Indeed,   to   be   able   to   hold   that   others   have   the   same
opportunities  to draw on the common of   ideas to create new
works   (HM2) and  therefore   that  an   intellectual  appropriation









Gordon's  argument  is   that  certain   intellectual  works come to
have   such  an   important   influence  on   culture   that  preventing
their   use   restricts   freedom of   expression.   In   a   given   cultural
context,   individuals  often  do  not  have   “enough  and  as   good”
other ways to express themselves than by reusing and referring







the  word   “Olympic”   limits   the   freedom   of   expression   of   the
organizers   of   a   competition   that   they   wanted   to   call   “Gay
Olympics”,   with   the   intent   of   associating   the   positive   and
mainstream connotations of   the word to help  fight  prejudices
against gays and  lesbians (Gordon, 1992, 1583).  Another case
shows how a group of  authors  of  subversive comics (the “Air
Pirates”)  were   restricted   in   their   freedom of   expression  when
they were  forbidden to disseminate parodies of Mickey Mouse
intended   to   challenge   Disney's   influence   on   mass   culture
(Gordon, 1992, 1601; cf. also Waldron, 1993).







on a  privately   owned  word”   (Hughes,  1988,  23).  Having   said
that, Hughes can easily admit Gordon's modest conclusion, i.e.
that a Lockean approach should provide some limitations and









argument   could   consist   in   demanding   justification   for   that
premise (HM0). A possible justification might rely on  a  prima
facie  claim that the author would have to the product of   its
labour, as Moore explicitly argue:
“When an  individual  creates  an original   intellectual  work





















already   partially   granted.   Absent   a   justification   for   premise
(HM0) that does not preclude the application of the proviso, it is




some   special   claims   to   use   intellectual   works,   but   rather   a







This   point   will   appear   more   clearly   from   our   discussion   of
Nozick's argument, to which we now turn.
7 Although it is unclear whether this “taking” necessarily involve a claim to an 
intellectual creation, since it is presented as a case of outright “theft” of a 
physical paper note.




intellectual   appropriation   necessarily   satisfies  Locke's   original
proviso,  and  therefore  does  not   require   compensation,  can  be
found   in   the   short   passage   Nozick   devotes   to   intellectual
property   (and   patent   law   in   particular).   The   core   of   the







“the   [author]   is   allowed   to   have   an   exclusive   control   of
something which otherwise might not and often would not
have   come  into   existence  at   all.   If   it  would  not,   ­if   the
patented article is something which society without a patent











(N3)   Therefore   an   intellectual   appropriation   does   not
deprive others







without   its   author?   A   first   objection,   which   challenges   the
generality   of   premise   (N1),   involves   the   possibility   of
independent   creation.   It   can   happen   that   two   individuals
independently   realize   a   very   similar   creation,   more   or   less






same   day9  (Ogburn   &  Thomas,   1922).   Considering   the   real










shared   cultural   framework,   the   possibility   of   independent




(alternatively   vi­IV­I­V)   is   common  to  numerous   songs,   from
classic tunes such as “Let it Be” by the Beatles, “No Woman No
Cry”  by Bob Marley,   “The Passenger”  by  Iggy Pop,   to  more
contemporary hits   like   “Paparazzi”  by Lady Gaga.  Of  course,
sometimes similarities can result from blunt copying. But within
a   fairly   limited   set   of   chords   and   progressions,   it   is   fairly
plausible that two creators will eventually stumble on a similar
song without conscious copying, or even without knowledge of
9 Although whether this is a proper case of independent creation is still 
controversial nowadays, because of Gray's accusations of misappropriation 
















legal   regimes  do11.  However,   in   that   scheme,   the   independent
creator   would   still   bear  the   significant   burden   of   proving
independent   creation,  which   clearly   affects  his  position.  More
fundamentally,   it   is  highly problematic   to  support   the  strong
claim   that   the   appropriation   does   not   deprive   others,   while
having   recourse   to   such   tinkering   as   defenses,   limitations   or
exceptions. Even if such corrections could reduce the probability
of   depriving   independent   creators,   its   mere   possibility
nonetheless undermines, in principle, the claim that intellectual
property necessarily respects the original Lockean proviso.
This   point   could   appear   like   a  mere   quibble.  But   let   us
emphasize that proprietarian reasoning, on which discussions on
the Lockean proviso  rely,   is  a  principled,  non­consequentialist
mode of reasoning. If intellectual property rights are presented
as   a   legitimate   entitlement   that   does   not   encroach   anyone's
freedom, they can only be justified as such, and not by arguing
that   the   probability   of   depriving   others   is   small.   The   same
objection was raised by  libertarian author James L. Walker  in
1888, in a comment that almost feels like an answer to Nozick's
10 As an illustration and (limited) support to this claim, a recent empirical study 
showed that given a background chord sequence, participants were likely to 
compose melodies that were not only similar to popular hit songs, but also 
similar to each other's compositions (Frieler and Riedermann, 2011)
11 In the United States, courts allow an independent creation defense. However, as 
some have noted, this defense is usually quite weak, as similarity alone is often 







with   some   general   principle...   [A]mong   the   things   not
logically   impossible,   I   know   of   few   nearer   the   limit   of
possibility   than   that   I   should   ever   desire   to   publish
[libertarian  journal] Liberty in  the middle of  the desert of
Sahara; nevertheless, this  would scarcely justify any great
political power in giving Stanley a right to stake out a claim





support   the   proprietarian   claim   that   intellectual   property
necessarily satisfies Locke's original proviso, it is not enough to
provide for some limitations and safeguards that minimize the









violate   the   original   proviso.   I   will   argue   that   the   relevant
baseline   to   apply   the   proviso   should   in   fact   be   one   where
individuals have a general privilege to use existing works, and
that   under   that   baseline   it   can   clearly   be   showed   that
intellectual property deprive others. 















property   regime.   Nozick's   argument   appeals   to   an   apparent
truism:   if   intellectual  appropriation only  covers  objects  which
would not have existed under the considered baseline, how could
anyone's   position   be   affected   at   all   in   comparison  with   that
baseline? 
But  Nozick's   choice   of  baseline   is  misleading.  While   it   is









Because   Nozick's  baseline   conflate   creation   with
appropriation, it needs to presuppose that without the possibility





Rather   than  supposing   that  creators  are   solely  moved  by









the  windfall   gains   coming   from   the   exploitation   of   exclusive
rights if she has the opportunity. 
So   perhaps   a   more   appropriate   phrasing   of   Nozick's
argument  would   be:   “An   inventor's   patent   does   not   deprive
others   of   the  an  object  which   their   inventor  would  not  have
created in the absence of a patent regime”. Stated in such terms,
we can apply the proviso to the different possible  cases.  The
proviso  would  be   obviously   satisfied   in   the   case   of   S:   if   the
invention  would   not   have   existed   without   the   possibility   to
patent   it,   then  Nozick   is   right   that   no   one   looses   from   the
patent.  The proviso  would also  be satisfied  in the case of  A,
provided that there is a possibility to waive one's property right.
















the   overall   legitimacy   of   a   general   regime   of   intellectual
property. Therefore the relevant question is to know whether the
establishment   of   such   a   regime  would   in   overall   not   deprive




12 Moore explicitly addresses this point (Moore, 2004, 121). However, his main 
“institutional” justification for intellectual property (stating that the absence of 



















“Whereas previously  [others]  were at  liberty (in Hohfeld's
sense)   to   use   the   object,   they   now   no   longer   are.   This
change in the situation of others (by removing their liberty
to  act  on a previously  unowned object)  need not  worsen
their situation” (Nozick, 1974, 175)
In a sense, this baseline is the relevant “state of nature”, from










condition  for   these  works  to  exist.  But  the outcome  is  much
more certain for works which would have existed anyway, but
would   be   appropriated   under   an   intellectual   property   regime
by causing creators not to disclose their inventions) does not appear to have 




(because   their   creators  are  O's).  With   regard   to   this   set   of
works,  Nozick's   paradox  does   not   apply,   and  we   can   clearly




nothing,   in   case   they  would  have  been   created  anyway  then
enforcing a property right on them  does  deprive others of the
liberty they would have had otherwise to use and reuse them in














expressions   does   not   reduce   the   intellectual   commons   or,   as
Nozick, that without the author, the work would not have been
created. The decisive point  is  that,  whereas  initially  everyone
had the privilege to reuse existing works, the establishment of an





Therefore   under   that   baseline,   an   intellectual   property










argue   that   the  Locke's   original   proviso  would   be   violated   if
individuals are deprived of the possibility to use and enjoy the
fruits of the labour of others. So why would it be different in the





















In   contrary   to   the   context   of  material   objects,   simultaneous








at   the   same   time   “inputs”   and   “outputs”   of   creation.  As   the
romantic picture of intellectual creation happening  ex nihilo  is
now   widely   discredited,   it   is   commonly   admitted   that   new
creations necessarily build on existing works (cf. Hettinger, 1989,









non­interference   that   the  author  has  on   the  work  he   created
merely begs the question. Even if we could make some positive
claims   in   line   with   Locke's   arguments   (based   on   labour   or
desert) to support a prima facie case for appropriation, it would





position,   because   it   prevents   him   to   make   money   from   it
(Gordon, 1992, p. 1548; Merges, 2011, p. 141). That the author




a   “right  to   benefit   from   another's   pains”,  which   is   explicitly
dismissed  by Locke  and other  proprietarian  authors   (Gordon,
1992, p. 1545), or to require “to better others”, and “to give them




13 In this paper, we avoid the interpretation of the Lockean proviso in terms of the 
“non-harm principle”, and stick with the aforementioned notion of “worsening” 
(or bettering) one's position, as defined by Nozick.






and not   the  violation  of  a   right   of  access   or  use   intellectual
works,  nor   the   exclusion   from  the   enjoyment   of   a  particular
work. This allows us to clear a potential misunderstanding: even
if, in the absence of an intellectual property regime, individuals
have   a   privilege   to   use  works,   authors  would   still   have   the
privilege to restrict uses of a work under their control, by all
means available to them. Because an author has control over his
manuscript,   he   could  prevent   others   to  use   it   by   keeping   it
secret,   or   build   technical   restrictions  measures   on   copies   he
distributes   to   consumers.   But,   without   a   proper   claim­right,
authors would not be able to appeal to the State to enforce these
restrictions on others.  The baseline  for  the application of  the
Lockean   proviso   is   thus   the   situation  where   both   users   and













(Moore,   1997,   79).   For   example,   the   incentive   effect   of   an





to   compare   the   different   effects   on   one's   situation).   An










we   narrow   the   relevant   alternatives   to   a   negative   counter­
factual, defined as the absence of a legal regime for intellectual
works?   If  we   are   to   take   the  Lockean   proviso   seriously,  we
should also consider how an intellectual property regime fares in
comparison  with   other   types   of   legal   regimes   for   intellectual
works.   In that perspective,  the prospects are rather bleak  for
intellectual property. Could we still argue that the introduction




We   can   see   that  moving   to   the   “revised”   version   of   the
Lockean proviso is not without consequences for those willing to
justify intellectual property. As they cannot simply assume that
intellectual   property  makes   no   one  worse   off  tout   court  (as





claim   that   appropriation   of   private   property   satisfies   the
intent behind the “enough and as good left over" proviso, not
as a utilitarian justification of property. They enter to rebut



















By relying  on  empirical   claims,   the  proprietarian  case   for
intellectual   property   is   therefore   vulnerable   to   the   same
empirical   objections   as   the   ones   faced   by   the   instrumental
(“utilitarian”)   case.  Moreover,  not  only  are  proponents   of   the
Lockean   justification   forced   to   argue   about   the   merits   of
intellectual property on an empirical basis, but they must also
show   that   intellectual   property   is   more   efficient   than   other
possible schemes, such as an alternative compensation system. 
Even if  such task proved feasible, Nozick's revised proviso














strength  in   the  literature on  intellectual  property.   In  his   last
book, Justifying Intellectual Property, Robert Merges notes that
“through all the doubts over empirical proof, [his] faith in the
necessity and  importance of   IP  law has only grown” since he
came to   favor   the  proprietarian  case   for   intellectual  property




grapple  with   the   intricacies   and  uncertainties   of   the   kind   of
consequentialist   reasoning   specific   to   the   instrumental
justification.











collapsing   in   a   kind   of   quasi­utilitarian   argument,   offering
neither   the   certainty   of   proprietarian   reasonings,   nor   the
intuitive appeal of utilitarian ones.
Of course, this is not to say that no proprietarian case for
intellectual   property   could   be  made.   In   this   paper,  we   only
addressed a specific category of Lockean arguments, the negative
justifications   aiming   to   justify   intellectual   property   on   the
grounds   that   it   satisfies   the   intellectual   proviso.  Admittedly,
other   proprietarian   arguments   could   provide   positive
justifications  for  the property right of  an author to  its  work,
based on the claim that he has mixed his  labour,  or that he
deserves   it,   or   that   the  work   forms  an  extension  of  his   self­
ownership. But as some have showed, these arguments are also
quite   disputable   (Attas,   2008).   Moreover,   in   so   far   as   the
Lockean   proviso   is   at   least   a   necessary   condition   for   the
legitimacy   of   appropriations,   these   arguments   would   also   be
affected  by   the   shortcomings  of   the  arguments  based  on   the
Lockean proviso15.
For   those  willing   to   reassert   the   legitimacy   of   copyright
regime,   the   instrumental   justification   appears   to   be   a  more
15 Though admittedly, arguments grounded in self-ownership, or other arguments 




for   those   willing   to   push   for   a   real   balance   between   the
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